If chapter 2 made sense, two objections should already be forming, because they formed in our group too: why would anyone pay hours before a game, and what happens to per player data when one phone pays for four people. Both are fair. Both have answers that make the business stronger, not weaker.
Correct, and they are being rational. This part shows why delaying is the smart move today, four ways to price a reservation, and the design that keeps holds honest without deleting anybody.
The game itself might not happen. Until a list is clearly filling, paying early means lending the game money and waiting out the refund if it dies.
Office, rain, Hennur traffic, mom. Plans firm up at 5–6 PM; the list opens at noon. A name is reversible, a payment isn't (quickly).
Half this group joins because their friends did, 862 "+1s" in ten weeks. You commit when your people commit, not before.
Writing your name costs nothing and can't be enforced. Economics 101: make an option free and everyone takes one, then payers find the door blocked by holders.
The roster stops pretending everyone is equally committed. It shows two truths side by side: money and intent, and converts one into the other under clear rules instead of social violence.
Anyone can hold a spot without paying, one tap. The hold lasts until the game's pay-deadline (Trisha sets it, e.g. 5 PM) and everyone can see the countdown. Your "maybe" is honest now: it seeds the game like the old list did, but it can't silently become a squat. Holds shrink as the game fills, last 3 spots are pay-only.
Game full, and someone new wants to pay? The oldest unpaid hold gets a push notification: "Someone's ready to pay for your spot, confirm in 30 min or it releases." That's the Taru–Tahir incident turned from a crime into a rule: payers are never blocked for long, holders are never deleted without warning and a fair chance.
Show up and pay on time → your future holds get longer and safer. Let holds expire repeatedly → you go pay-first for a while. Regulars get trust automatically; serial squatters lose the option, the system learns who "maybe" actually means yes from.
The goal is right and the note keeps it. This part shows where the current rule leaks (stuck funnels, proxy payments, no shows) and how squad payments can capture more identity, not less.
Identity is only captured when a solo checkout succeeds. Every failure, no time, no OTP, no UPI, becomes a hole in the list or a lie in the DB.
Same four people end up in the database, more, actually: the ones who currently give up at OTP or UPI. The checkpoint moves; the data doesn't shrink.
Games, position, attendance %, pay speed, per human, not per paying phone.
Who brings whom. Your real acquisition map, invisible today because +1s are ghosts.
Fill-speed by slot, format, price. Stop guessing between 7v7 at 8 or 9v9 at 9:30, the data answers.
No-show risk per player, feeds hold length, reminders, and who you trust with a “maybe”.